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Reversing the Nondelegation Rule
of Trust-Investment Law
John H. Langbein"
The nondelegation rule has been a familiar feature of the doctrinal
landscape of the Anglo-American law of trusts. In the formulation of the
Restatement of Trusts (Second) of 1959, the rule places the trustee "under a
duty to the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the
The
trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform."'
nondelegation rule was thought to apply with particular force to the trustee's
investment responsibilities. The Restatement (Second) says flatly: "A trustee
cannot properly delegate to another power to select investments."2
The new Restatement of Trusts (Third): Prudent Investor Rule,
completed in 1992, rejects the nondelegation rule of the 1959 Restatement.
The 1992 Restatement-hereafter, Restatement (Third)-is a partial revision
of the Restatement (Second), limited to matters bearing on trust-investment
law. Not only does the Restatement (Third) approve delegation, it imposes
upon the trustee a positive duty to act prudently in considering "whether and
A projected Uniform Prudent
how to delegate" investment functions
Investor Act (UPIA), scheduled for approval by the Uniform Law Commission
in 1994, implements the prodelegation position taken in the Restatement
(Third) and articulates standards for effective delegation.4 The changed
attitude toward delegation that characterizes the Restatement (Second) and
UPIA was foreshadowed across the previous decades in a series of influential
enactments that endorsed the delegation of fiduciary investment responsibilities: the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act in 1964, the Uniform Institutional
Management of Funds Act (UMIFA) in 1972, and ERISA, the federal pension
law, in 1974. 5

* Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959). The Restatement (Second)
carries this language forward from the Restatement (First). See RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS § 171 (1935).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt. h (1959). For supporting
.authority see 2A AuSTIN W. SCOTr & WILIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 171.2, at 446-47 & n.8 (4th ed. 1987) (1987-91) [hereafter cited as ScoTr &
FRATCHER].

3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(c)(2) (1992).
4. Discussed infra in Part III of this Article.
5. These legislative developments are discussed infra, text accompanying notes

25-41.
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This movement from nondelegation to delegation seems to entail a
doctrinal volte face. A main theme of the present Article, however, is that
there is less to this change than meets the eye. Practice under the
nondelegation rule has led to the repudiation of the rule. Nevertheless, the
new delegation rule may affect future patterns of trusteeship. By making it
easier for trustees to externalize the investment function, the reformed law will
encourage persons who lack investment expertise-for example, family
members and lawyers-to serve as trustees.
The nondelegation rule is a fitting subject to address in a Festschrif for
William Fratcher. Throughout his illustrious career as a scholar of trust and
estate law, Fratcher took a special interest in the delegation question. In an
influential article published three decades ago, he drew attention to the benign
experience of the English and Commonwealth jurisdictions in largely ridding
themselves of the nondelegation rule.6 Fratcher's revision of Scott on Trusts'
contains the authoritative account of delegation questions on the eve of the
Restatement (Third). As a member of the American Law Institute's Board of
Advisors for the Restatement (Third),8 Fratcher contributed his experienced
hand to the reform that is discussed in this Article.
I. THE NONDELEGATION RULE
A. Purposes of the Rule
It's hard to quibble with the idea that a trustee has a duty "not to delegate
to others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required
personally to perform,"9 which is the way that the Restatement (Second)
expresses the nondelegation rule. The trouble is that this formulation begs its
own question: When, indeed, is it "reasonable" to require the trustee to
perform some act of trust administration in person? The standard of
reasonableness directs attention to the purposes of the nondelegation rule.
Only by identifying the purposes can we ascertain whether particular conduct
is reasonable.
1. Trustee succession. The most important function that the
nondelegation rule serves is to reinforce the well-settled requirement of trust

6. William F. Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U. L,REV. 627,
639-40, 660 (1962). Regarding the modem English law, see Dennis Paling, The Duty
to Act Personally,125 NEW L.J. 56 (1975); Gareth H. Jones, Delegationby Trustees:
A Reappraisal,22 MODERN L. REV. 381 (1959). For recent judicial authority, see
Steel v. Wellcome Custodian Trustees, Ltd., [1987] 1 W.L.R. 167 (Ch. Div.).
7. 2A Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 171, at 437-51.
8. See preface to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, at v (1992).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959).
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law that a trustee may not resign the trusteeship without permission of the
court.'0 This protective requirement operates to assure that trustee succession
will occur in an orderly fashion, with notice to interested parties, usually
incident to a fiduciary accounting. By forbidding the trustee to delegate the
"whole responsibility for the administration of the trust,""1 the nondelegation
rule prevents a trustee from evading the rule against unsupervised resignation
of the trust. If total delegation of the trust were permitted, the trustee could
effectively install a successor trustee in the guise of agency without complying
with the safeguards for trustee succession.
Notice, however, that this concern has nothing to do with the question of
whether a trustee might intelligently delegate a particular function, in order to
take advantage of an agent's superior skill, facilities, economies of scale, or
the like. Delegation of trust investing responsibilities to an outside investment
advisor typifies such a situation.
2. Personaltrusteeship. Another value that lurks in the nondelegation
doctrine is the notion that the personality of the trustee is sometimes central
to the purpose of the trust. In such a case, allowing the particular trustee to
delegate the office would defeat the purpose and the reliance of the settlor in
creating the trust. 2 However, the case in which the creation of the trust is
conditioned upon the personality of the trustee is in general rare, and is as a
practical matter unknown in trust-investment matters. We can write the terms
for such a trust (e.g., "This trust shall fail of creation or shall terminate if
George Smith shall be unwilling or unable to conduct the trust's invest-

ments"), but it iseasy to understand why people do not create such conditions.
Investment professionals abound. The settlor may prefer one over others, just
as I might prefer one surgeon over others, but if that surgeon is unavailable,
I am likely to accept a close substitute rather than to decline cure.
The question of policy for trust law is, therefore, whether the default rule
ought to presume this special concern with the personality of the trustee. If
the default rule of the Restatement (Second) were reversed, and the power to
delegate were presumed, as the Restatement (Third) and the draft UPIA have
now done, the settlor of any particular trust would still be able to impose the
opposite rule, insisting by apt drafting that the investment function or some
other attribute of the administration of the trust be nondelegable.

10. Id. § 106.
11. 2A ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 171.1, at 439. See id. at 440-41
(regarding special measures to facilitate total delegation in the case of a trustee called
to active military duty).
12. Scott hints at this notion in explaining the nondelegation rule: "This duty [to
perform the trust personally] is imposed on the trustee not because of any provisions
in the terms of the trust, but because of the relationship that arises from the creation
of the trust." 2A ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 171, at 437-38.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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3. Cost. Yet another issue that underlies the nondelegation doctrine is
concern about "double dipping." If the trustee is charging for investment
services, the trust should not have to pay again to have an outside investment
manager do the job. But the nondelegation rule is a clumsy tool for protecting
against overcharging. Trust law already imposes upon the trustee an
independent duty of reasonableness in incurring expenses. 3 Both the
Restatement (Third) and the proposed Uniform Prudent Investor Act look to
that safeguard for protecting against overcharging in delegation settings. 4
4. Discretionaryfimctions. No version of the nondelegation rule
proscribes all delegation. Because the traditional rule applies to acts that the
trustee "can reasonably be required personally to perform,"' 5 the inference
follows that some acts need not be performed personally. And indeed, it has
been commonplace under the nondelegation rule for trustees to employ
lawyers, accountants, investment advisors, brokers, and other specialized
service providers. When a piece of residential real estate is held in trust for
family members, the list of agents whom the trustee may employ can lengthen
to include the panoply of household providers-gardeners, plumbers, cleaning
staff, house painters, and so forth. The trustee does not have to take out the
garbage or paint the house in person. These are tasks that, in the parlance of
the Restatement (Second), the trustee cannot "reasonably be required to

perform. 06
The Restatement (Second) supplies little guidance on what makes some
delegation reasonable and some not. The official comment admits that the
drafters could identify no "clear-cut line dividing the acts which a trustee can
properly delegate from those which he cannot properly delegate.' 7 Instead
of a standard, the Restatement (Second) points to some illustrative factors,
including "the amount of discretion involved," the size of the assets in
question, and the trustee's ability to deal with the matter. 8 The emphasis on

13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 188 (1959). The Restatement (Third)
incorporates this obligation in its revised prudent investor rule. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 227(c)(3) (1992).
14. RESTATEMENT (THRMD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992); UNIFORM PRUDENT
INVESTOR ACT §§ 7, 10, and comments (August 23, 1993, draft).

15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959), reproduced supra text
accompanying note 1.
16. Id
17. Id § 171 cmt. d, at 374.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt. d (1959):
In considering what acts a trustee can properly delegate the following
circumstances, among others, may be of importance: (1) the amount of
discretion involved; (2) the value and character of the property involved; (3)
whether the property is principal or income; (4) the proximity or remoteness
of the subject matter of the trust; (5) the character of the act as one
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distinguishing between "ministerial" functions that the trustee may delegate
from "discretionary" functions that are nondelegable has proved to be a
labeling game, because "even the most menial of tasks involves some
discretion." 19
Whatever the difficulty of distinguishing the discretionary from the
ministerial elsewhere in trust administration, the Restatement (Second) treats
the investment function as an easy case. "A trustee cannot properly delegate
to another power to select investments."2" Nevertheless, the nondelegation
rule of the Restatement (Second) allows the trustee to employ outside
investment advisors, so long as the trustee forms an independent judgment
about the merits of the investment that the advisors recommended. Often

enough, this results in de facto delegation. "When the investment advisor

'recommends' and the trustee routinely 'decides' to follow the advice, the
trustee in reality is delegating the selection of investments."'" In these cases
the nondelegation rule, by promoting makework, collides with the policy of
minimizing expenses. Thus, the nondelegation rule that is bottomed to some
extent on a policy against double dipping actually promotes double dipping.
B. Questioningthe Default Rule
We have seen that, although it makes sense to forbid total delegation of
the trust, the rule preventing the trustee from delegating particular functions,
especially trust investing, is hard to justify. The inability to distinguish
effectively between discretionary functions that are nondelegable and
ministerial tasks that can be delegated reflects the inability to articulate clear
purposes for the nondelegation rule.
Virtually all trust law is default law-rules that the settlor can overturn
by apt drafting-and nondelegation is no exception. A well-drafted trust
instrument can easily defeat the nondelegation rule. Model trust instruments
in current formbooks authorize broad delegation.' Because trust profession-

involving professional skill or facilities possessed or not possessed by the
trustee himself.
19. William L. Cary & Craig B. Bright, The Delegationof Investment Responsibility for Endowment Funds, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 224 (1974) (emphasis in
original).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt. h (1959), discussed supra
text accompanying note 2.
21. John H. Langbein &Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment
Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 20.

22. Eg., 18 HENRY J. LISCHER JR. & DONALD J. MALOUF, WEST'S LEGAL
FORMS: ESTATE PLANNING WITH TAX ANALYSIS: WILLS, TRUSTS AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS § 22.3(10), at 556 (1985).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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als are hostile to the nondelegation rule, the rule works mostly as a trap for
the unwary-that is, for persons served by bad lawyers or by no lawyers.
The case for permitting trustees to delegate various aspects of trust
administration, especially investment functions, is straightforward. The
circumstances of modem life that have resulted in ever greater specialization
and expertise elsewhere in economic and administrative life affect trust
administration as well. The trust originated as a relatively passive or inactive
stakeholder's device, primarily used for conveying real property within the
family. Over the last century or so, awesome changes have occurred in the
patterns of private wealthholding. ' When ancestral land was the characteristic trust asset, trust administration required of the trustee relatively little
expertise or authority. Trustees were mostly stakeholders, and the family
lived on the estate and managed its affairs. Today, by contrast, financial

instruments have become the typical assets of the trust, and these assets
require active fiduciary administration. Managing a portfolio of marketable
securities is as demanding a specialty as stomach surgery or nuclear engineering. There is no more reason to expect the ordinary individual serving as a
trustee to possess the requisite investment expertise than to expect ordinary
citizens to possess expertise in gastroenterology or atomic science.
It is inevitable, therefore, that well-intentioned trustees will seek out and
rely upon outside advisors in the conduct of the investment function. When
the law forbids the trustee from delegating the investment function, the trustee
engages expert advice but purports to make an independent decision about
whether to follow that advice. If the investment is subsequently challenged,
the legal dispute then concerns the delegation question-that is, "Did the
trustee exercise a judgment independent of the advisor?" By contrast, when
trust law permits the trustee to delegate investment responsibilities to outside
professionals, the delegation doctrine directs attention to a more useful
question, which is whether the trustee used due care in selecting, instructing,
and monitoring the agent.'
The traditional rule forbidding delegation
disserved trust beneficiaries by preventing open discussion of the standards
and safeguards appropriate to delegation.

23. I have discussed these matters at some length in John H. Langbein, The
Twentieth Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722
(1988).
24. The standards of the Restatement of Trusts (Third) and the draft Uniform
Prudent Investor Act, discussed in Part III of this Article, infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/9
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C. Landmarks on the Path Away from
the Nondelegation Rule
Three important legislative initiatives presaged the movement from
nondelegation to delegation of investment responsibilities in trust law.
1. Uniform Trustees' Powers Act. The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act
(1964)' embodies a broad liberalization of the law of trustee powers. The
Act is designed to facilitate the management of modem trust assets, especially
financial assets. Section 3(24) of the Act effectively abrogates the
nondelegation rule for specialized service providers. It authorizes trustees
to employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment
advisers, or agents, even if they are associated with the trustee,
to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of his administrative duties; to act without independentinvestigationupon their
recommendations; and instead of actingpersonally,to employ
one or more agents to perform any act ofadministration, whether
or not discretionary.... 26
The Uniform Trustee Powers Act has not been widely adopted,27
probably because most jurisdictions already had a developed statutory set of
trustee powers by the time the Uniform Act was drafted in 1964. But
section 3(24) of the Act is a notable milestone: the Uniform Law Commission28 was persuaded to reverse the default rule and authorize delegation of

investment and other specialized functions only a few years after the
Restatement (Second) had perpetuated the contrary rule.
2. UMIFA. The Uniform Law Commission returned to the delegation
question in a slightly different setting less than a decade later. The Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA) (1972)29 authorizes the
governing boards of eleemosynary institutions, who are trustee-like fiduciaries,
to delegate investment matters, either to a committee of the board or to
outside investment advisors, investment counsel, managers, banks, or trust

25. 7B U.L.A. 743 (1985 & 1993 Supp. at 189).
26. UNIFoRM TRUsTEES' PowERs ACT § 3(24) (emphasis supplied); 7B U.L.A.
748 (1985).
27. Sixteen states, mostly smaller ones, have adopted the Act. See 7B U.L.A.,
1993 Supp. at 188. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) § 3-715 incorporates much of
the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act. UPC § 3-715(21) republishes § 3(24) of the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, extending its reach to the fiduciary responsibilities of
personal representatives.
28. Shorthand for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
29. 7A U.L.A. at 705 (1985) & 1993 Supp. at 237.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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companies.3 This provision has been enacted in 34 states and the District
of Columbia. 1
UMIFA shows the response of a sophisticated set of "consumers" of
fiduciary-investment law who felt themselves unable to take the ordinary path
around an unwanted default rule. When trust law gets the wrong default rule,
specialist counsel usually'countermand the rule by tailoring a contrary term in
the trust instrument. "Opting out" in this way leaves the mistaken default rule
on the books as a snare for others but eliminates the obstacle for counsel's
own client. This strategy is sometimes awkward for an existing charitable
trust, foundation, or charitable corporation to pursue. Many nonprofit charters
and trust instruments were drafted decades, even centuries ago, before there
was occasion to foresee the need to countermand the irritants of an inadequate
trust-investment law. Furthermore, because charitable trusts and the like are
quasi-public institutions, and subject to regulatory oversight by the attorney
general or other authorities,32 it is not always clear that the charitable
organization can unilaterally opt out of unwanted default law. Thus, in the
case of UMIFA, nonprofit organizations led by the Ford Foundation agitated
for uniform legislation to reverse the default rule. 3
3. ERISA. The most important development in the decline of the
nondelegation doctrine was its repudiation in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),34 the federal pension regulatory law. ERISA governs

the affairs of pension and employee benefit plans. The statute mandates that
the assets of plans that do not take the form of insurance contracts must be
held in trust.3 This regime of mandatory trusteeship governs one and a half
trillion dollars in plan assets.36
For its federal law of pension and employee benefit trusts ERISA carries
forward from the common law of trusts the fundamental duties of loyalty,
prudent administration, and diversification of investments. 7 However,
ERISA forthrightly repeals the nondelegation rule. Section 403(a)(2) allows
a pension or employee benefit plan to provide that "authority to manage,

30. UMIFA § 5, 7A U.L.A. at 720 (1985) & 1993 Supp. at 239.
31. See 7A U.L.A., 1993 Supp. 'at 235 for list of adopting jurisdictions.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
33. See generallyWILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE DEVELOPING LAW
OF ENDOWMENT FuNDS: "THE LAW AND THE LORE"REVIsrrED:

A REPORT TO THE

FORD FOUNDATION (1974 ed.); CARY & BRIGHT, supra note 19.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
35. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
36. JOSEPH S. PIACENTINI & JILL D. FOLEY, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS 114 (2d ed. 1992).

37. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)-(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1988 &Supp. III
1991).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/9
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acquire or dispose of assets of the plan is delegated to one or more investment
managers.... ."' The logic of ERISA's regime has been described in this
way:
ERISA ... invites the dissolution, of unitary trusteeship....
ERISA's fractionation of traditional trusteeship
reflects the complexity of the modem pension trust. Because

millions, even billions of dollars can be involved, great care is
required in investing and safekeeping plan assets. Administering
such plans-computing and honoring benefit entitlements across
decades of employment and retirement-is also a complex

business.... Since, however, neither the sponsor nor any other
single entity has a comparative advantage in performing all these
functions, the tendency has been for pension plans to use a
variety of specialized providers. A consulting actuary, a plan
administration firm, or an insurance company may oversee the
design of a plan and arrange for processing benefit claims.
Investment industry professionals manage the portfolio (the
largest plans spread their pension investments among dozens of
money management firms).39

ERISA is careful to deal with the consequences of its prodelegation
regime. The statute attaches its system of fiduciary liability not only to the
trustee, but to all persons who exercise discretion 4° over plan assets;
investment advisors are especially singled out as fiduciaries. 4 ' When ERISA
trustees have been derelict in selecting and monitoring agents, the federal
courts have rightly imposed liability.42

38. ERISA § 403(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(2) (1988).
39. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENsION AND
LAw

EMPLOYEE BENEFT

496 (1990).

40. Contrast the peculiar interest in testing for discretion under the traditional
nondelegation rule, discussed supra text accompanying notes 17-21, where the
consequence of finding that an agent's function was discretionary was to deem the
trustee in violation of the nondelegation rule. The purpose of ERISA's discretion
standard is to cast an appropriately broad net of fiduciary duty over those persons to
whom delegation is encouraged.
41. ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1988).
42. Compare Whitfield v. Cohen, 682 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding
imprudent selection of investment advisor) with In re Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension
Plan, 11 E.B.C. 2629 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (serious issues of fact justify refusing summary
judgment on allegation that selection of investment advisor was improper); both cases
noted in Bernard M. Baum, Trusteesand Their Professionals,18 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
J. 7 (1993).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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4. Overview on the eve of the Restatement (Third). The nondelegation
rule of the law of trusts entered the 1990s considerably weakened. Special
legislation reversed the rule for the most important trusts, pension trusts and
charities. The nondelegation rule survived as default law for private trusts in
most jurisdictions that had not enacted the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, but
counsel in those jurisdictions routinely countermanded the rule for professionally drafted trust instruments.
III. THE NEW RESTATEMENT AND THE PROPOSED UNIFORM ACT
A. Restatement (Third)
The Restatement (Third), promulgated in 1992, repeals the nondelegation
rule of the Restatement (Second) and supplies the following substitute black
letter rule:
A trustee has a duty personally to perform the responsibilities of trusteeship except as a prudent person might delegate
those responsibilities to others. In deciding whether, to whom,
and in what manner to delegate fiduciary authority in the
administration of a trust, and thereafter in supervising agents, the
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to exercise fiduciary
discretion and to act as a prudent person would act in similar
circumstances.43
The 1992 Restatement integrates this delegation standard into its revised
prudent investor rule, which provides that "the trustee must ... act with
prudence in deciding whether and how to delegate authority to others.""
Two fundamental principles characterize the delegation regime of the
Restatement (Third). First,the default rule is reversed: delegationsubstitutes
for nondelegation. Indeed, the trustee not only has the power to delegate, the
trustee "may sometimes have a duty ... to delegate [investment] functions
...in such manner as a prudent investor would delegate under the circumstances."45 This prodelegation standard of the Restatement (Third) eliminates
the need under Restatement (Second) to limit the use of agents to "ministerial"
functions, and the Restatement (Third) explains that delegation is not
"precluded because the act in question calls for the exercise of considerable
judgment or discretion."'

43.

RESTATEMNT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §

171 (1992).

44. Id § 227(c)(2).
45. id § 227 cmt. j, at 38.
46. Id at 39.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/9
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Second, however, the Restatement (Third) applies a fiduciary regime to
the trustee's delegation determinations,much as is done in ERISA. The
standard of prudent administration attaches to (1) the trustee's decision to
delegate, (2) the trustee's selection of agents, and (3) the trustee's oversight
("supervising") of agents' performance. Judicial oversight is available on the
familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of trust law.47 The official comment
explains:
A trustee's discretionary authority in the matter of delegation may be abused by imprudent failure to delegate as well as
by making an imprudent decision to delegate. Abuse of
discretion may also be found in failure to exercise prudence in
the degree or manner of delegation. Prudence thus requires the
exercise of care, skill, and caution in the selection of agents and
in negotiating and establishing the terms of delegation. Significant terms of a delegation include those involving the compensation of the agent, the duration and conditions of the delegation,
and arrangements for monitoring or supervising the activities of
agents. 48
The Restatement (Third) was drafted by a skillful reporter, Professor
Edward C. Halbach Jr. The reform of delegation law undertaken in the
Restatement (Third) arises from Halbach's larger project, which is to update
the prudent investing standard of trust-investment law for the purpose of
accommodating developments in fiduciary investment practice that have
occurred in recent decades under the influence of so-called Modem Portfolio
Theory (MPT). The new Restatement absorbs from MPT a set of precepts for
enhancing investment results. It treats the portfolio as a whole rather than
individual investments as the relevant entity.49 In place of the categoric
restrictions upon types of investments suitable for fiduciaries that characterized
older trust law, the Restatement (Third) follows MPT in directing attention to
the risk/return curve."0 Responding to the central concern of MPT to squeeze

§ 171 cmt. a, at 141 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187
47. Id.
(1959)).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt. a, at 141 (1992).

49. The prudent investing standard of the Restatement (Third) "is to be applied
to investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio and as part of
an overall investment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives
reasonably suitable to the trust." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (1992).

50. On risk/return, see the extract from Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227(a)
(1959), reproduced supranote 49; on the repudiation of categoric restrictions, see id,
comment f, at 24: "Specific investments or techniques of investment are not per se
prudent or imprudent. The riskiness of a specific property, and thus the propriety of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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out the uncompensated risk of inadequate diversification, the new Restatement
emphasizes the duty to diversify trust investments. It incorporates a strongly
worded duty to diversify trust investments within the definition of prudent
investing."1
This reorientation in trust-investment law toward highly diversified, large-

portfolio investing presupposes increasingprofessionalizationofthe investment
function, which is why the Restatement (Third) abrogates the nondelegation
rule as part of its larger enterprise. For most small trusts, the path of the
future will be greater use of pooled investment vehicles such as common trust
funds and mutual funds. For larger trusts that continue to do individualized
investing, investment professionals will increasingly be in command. And
thus -the decision to reverse the former nondelegation rule of Restatement
(Second)52 and to incorporate within the new prudent investor rule of
Restatement (Third) the duty to decide "whether and how to delegate ....
B. UPL4
Although officially promulgated in 1992, the Restatement (Third) was
approved by the American Law Institute at its 1990 plenary meeting, subject
to final editing. Interest in. adapting the principles of th6 new Restatement to
legislation was immediate. Illinois enacted a revision of its prudent investor
statute patterned loosely on the Restatement (Third) in 1991,' and Virginia
enacted a modest version in 1992. 55 In 1991 the Uniform Law Commission
authorized the drafting of a Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA). I have
served as the reporter for a drafting committee drawn from the Joint Editorial
Board for the Uniform Probate Code, with Professor Richard Wellman as
chair. The UPIA project has advanced through several versions of the draft
act. At the present writing, the current draft of UPIA is dated August 23,
1993. Thdt draft incorporates changes resulting from a first reading at the
1993 annual meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Further revisions will be undertaken before a projected
second and final reading at the 1994 annual meeting. There is, of course, no
guarantee that the Commissioners will approve this or any version of UPIA.

its inclusion in the trust estate, is not judged in the abstract but in terms of its
anticipated effect on the particular trust's portfolio."
51. Id § 227(b).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959), reproduced supra text
accompanying note 1.
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(c)(2) (1992).
54. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 515 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1 (Michie 1992).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/9

12

1994]

Langbein: Langbein: Reversing the Nondelegation Rule
REVERSING THE NONDELEGATIONRULE

Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to expose the pending draft for comment,
so long as readers are aware that the projected text may change.
Like the Restatement (Third) that it tracks, the draft UPIA treats
delegation in consequence of its revision of the prudent investor standard.
The UPIA undertakes to implement the main principles of the 1992 Restatement: portfolio as opposed to individual investment standard, sensitivity to
the risk/return curve as opposed to categoric restrictions on types of investments, intensified duty to diversify investments, and abrogation of the
nondelegation rule as applied to trust investing. Section 9 of the UPIA sets
forth the regime for delegation:
(a) A trustee may delegate investment and management
functions that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could
properly delegate under the circumstances. The trustee shall
exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in (1) selecting the
agent; (2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation
consistent with the purposes and terms of the trust; and (3)
periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor the
agent's performance and compliance with the scope and terms
of the delegation.
(b) In performing a delegated function, the agent has a
duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the
terms of the delegation.
(c) The trustee who complies with the requirements of
subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for
the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the function was
delegated.5"
Subsection (a) of this text closely follows the Restatement (Third) in
treating the decision of whether and how to delegate as a part of the trustee's
overall responsibility for prudent investing. Prudent delegation requires
appropriate care in selecting, instructing, and monitoring the agent.
Subsection (c) makes it clear that the trustee who delegates prudently is
not an insurer." Not every decision to delegate investment responsibilities

56. UPIA § 9 (August 23, 1993, draft). A further subsection (d), not reproduced
above, provides that the agent who accepts "the delegation of a trust function from the
trustee of a trust that is subject to the law of [this State], . . . submits to the
jurisdiction of the courts of [this State]."
57. See also UPIA § 8 (August 23, 1993, draft), regarding the standard of review,
which declares: "The prudent investor rule imposes a standard of conduct, not
outcome. Compliance with the prudent investor rule is determined in the light of the
facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the trustee's decision or action." The
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will turn out successfully. If the trustee exercises prudence in complying with
the standards of subsection (a) regarding the selection, instruction, and
supervision of the agent, then the trustee is not liable for the conduct of the
agent. Under the former nondelegation rule, quite a different result could be
reached. An old Washington case concluded that the trustee who delegated
"becomes a guarantor and is responsible for any loss that may have resulted,
whether or not such loss can be shown to be the result of the delegation
. The purpose of such a standard-to deter any variety of delegation-is quite contrary to the modem policy, which is to encourage trustees
to lodge investment functions with professionals.
IV. CONCLUSION
I conclude this Article by returning to a theme sounded at the outset:
that the seeming flip-flop in black letter trust law from the nondelegation rule
of the Restatement (Second) to the prodelegation rule of the Restatement
(Third) and UPIA entails a much less radical change of direction than appears
at first blush.
The core of the nondelegation rule abides. For reasons that make good
sense, the Restatement (Second) proscribes total delegation of the trust. The
Restatement (Third) perpetuates that rule, continuing to impose upon the
trustee "a duty personally to perform the responsibilities of the trusteeship
59
except as a prudent person might delegate those responsibilities to others.11
We have seen why total delegation of the trust is imprudent. But careful
delegation for the purpose of taking advantage of external expertise and
economies, especially in investment matters, unambiguously benefits the trust
and its beneficiaries. Thus, the Restatement (Third) and the draft UPIA
encourage trustees to delegate trust investment responsibilities. We have seen,
however, that there is little novelty in trustees' using investment advisors
under the traditional nondelegation rule. Either the drafter of the trust
instrument waived the default rule and authorized the trustees to delegate
investment activities; or trustees who engaged investment advisors went
through the motions of forming a supposedly independentjudgment to follow
the advice of these "ministerial" persons.

official comment to UPIA § 8, id, says: "Trustees are not insurers. Not every
investment or management decision will turn out in the light of hindsight to have been
-successful. Hindsight is not the relevant standard."
58. Meek v. Behrens, 252 P. 91, 95 (Wash. 1927), supersededby statuteas stated
in Gillespie v. Seattle-First National Bank, 855 P.2d 680 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1992).

60. Supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
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The real state of the law of delegation has been for many decades that
any trust settlor sophisticated enough to want delegation authority for a private
trust could get it. Delegation on demand has been the actual law during the
time that nondelegation has been the nominal law. Accordingly, it seems right
to see the Restatement (Third) and the string of legislative initiatives reversing
the nondelegation rule as reforms directed as much to candor as to substance.
Honesty may be a modest gain, but a gain it surely is.
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